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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v, 
EFRAIN ROJOS HARO, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 19069 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, EFRAIN ROJOS HARO, appeals from the 
Judgment and conviction after a jury trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding, of 
two counts of Aggravated Assault, felonies in the Third 
Degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted on January 6, 1983, and 
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate 
terms of zero to five years to run consecutively. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his convictions of 
,,,1,iravated Assault, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
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OF FACTS 
On the 31st day ,if Auqust, 1982, Mr. Phillip Tatum 
heard voices outside his apartment window (T. 6-7). He 
testified that he heard a number of voices, at least half a 
dozen (T. lJ). he could not distinguish what 
language they were speaking nor the individuals speaking 
(T. 14, 17). After a moment or two, he heard an explosion 
and went to his window and saw Efrain Haro, his neighbor, 
standing over Carlos and Miguel Ibarra holding a pistol and 
yelling (T. 8). He then saw Mr. Haro run towards his apart-
ment (T. 8) . Hhen Tatum came out, he saw Carlos Ibarra on th 
ground bleeding. 
Mr. Tatum indicated that he knew Mr. Ibarra because 
his boy plays with Mr. Ibarra's boy (T. 8, 19). He further 
indicated that he had never had a conversation with either 
Carlos or Miguel Ibarra because they do not speak English 
(T. 21). The direct examination of Carlos Ibarra was 
conducted through a translator. 
Mr. Carlos Ibarra throuah his interpreter said that 
on the niaht of August 31, 1982, he was home watching T.V. 
when he and his brother Miguel decided to go for a walk 
(T. ::08-30). 
Miguel and Carlos Ibarras' testimony was very simila 
They testified that they fur a late at night, and 
Haro came out frol'1 his 3['art!'1ent bu1lui'1g, poi'1ted a 
gun at the midsection of Carlos Ibarra then down at his leg 
and shot. They further testified that he later pointed the 
qun at Miguel and said, "Do you want some too?" in Spanish 
\r 37-70). 
Defendant's testimony was that another individual 
named tlr. Romero had overheard the victims talking about 
qett1ng Mr. Haro and led Mr. Haro to believe that they 
intended to come over and rob him, thus initiating the shoot-
ing. That witness was unavailable for trial (T. 74-100). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLO\HNG HEARSAY 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT INTO THE RECORD 
UNDER THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION 
The pertinent rule of evidence applicable at the time 
of trial was Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
l1l_ t l lil' 
Evidence of a statement which is made other 
than by a witness while testifying at the 
hearing offered to prove the truth of the 
matter stated is hearsay evidence and inad-
missible except: ... (4) Contemporaneous 
Statements and Statements Admissible on 
Ground of Necessity Generally --A statement 
(a) which the judge finds was made while the 
defendant was perceiving the event or condi-
tion which the statement narrates, describes, 
or exolains, or (b) which the judge finds 
was made while the declarant was under the 
stress of a nervous excitement caused by 
such perception. 
lh1s Court most recently construed the excited 
exLcrt1on in State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162, 163 
I t J 1- 1 g - R ) • In outlining the requirements of the exception 
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provided for in Rule 63(4), the Court quoted the Washington 
Supreme Court in Johnston v. Ohls, 457 P.2d 194 at 199 
(Washington 1969): 
The crucial question in all cases is whether 
the statement was made while the declarant 
was under the influence of the event to the 
extent that his statement could not be the 
result of fabrication, intervening actions, 
or in the exercise of choice or judgment. 
In order for such a statement to be under the influ-
ence of the exciting event, the statement need not be strictli 
contemporaneous. Wigmore on Evidence notes: 
It is to be observed that the statements need 
not be strictly contemporaneous with the 
exacting cause: they may be subsequent to 
it, provided there has not been time for the 
exciting influence to lose its sway and to be 
dissipated. 
John Wigmore, Evidence in Trial at Common Law, §1750 
(6th ed. 1976). 
This rationale was relied upon by the court in 
Johnston v. Ohls, in stating, "It is not necessary that 
the statement in question be made simultaneously with the 
event and some fluctuation in the time element is neces-
sarily allowed." Id. at 199. See also !1ay v. Wright, 381 
P.2d 601 (Washington 1963). 
In addition to affirming the fluctuation in time 
element of excited utterances, May v. Wright, 381 P.2d 601, 
has special significance in the instant case. The court 
in May v. Wright, 381 P.2d 601, noted: 
In the normal situation the trial court has 
exercised its discretion by either permitting 
or rejecting the admission of on 
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the basis of their being excited utterances 
(often referred to by the label res gestae); 
and on appeal this court has exercised some 
deference to the exercise of discretion by 
the trial court in applying a flexible 
standard. In the instant case, however, the 
comments of the trial court do not indicate 
a reliance upon the concept of excited 
utterance in ruling upon the question of 
admissibility. So consideration and defer-
ence to an exercise of discretion by the 
trial court are not within the purview of 
this case. 
Id. 381 P.2d at 603-04. 
Subsequently, the court in May v. Wright found admissible 
certain excited utterances given to a police officer by the 
declarant twenty minutes after the exciting cause. 
FAILURE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE WAS ERROR 
In the present case the appellant contends that it 
was reversible error for the trial court to disallow the 
appellant, Mr. Haro, to testify as to the excited statements 
of Mr. Romero (T. 92). 
The appellant testified that he and his neighbor, 
Mr. Romero, had been watching television in the appellant's 
apartment (T. 86). Appellant testified that Carlos Ibarra, 
whom the appellant wounded a few hours later, was peering 
into the appellant's apartment through the open front door 
(T. 90). Carlos Ibarra signaled to the appellant's friend, 
Mr. Romero, that he wanted to speak with him (T. 91). The 
testified that Mr. Romero talked to Carlos Ibarra 
for around five minutes outside of the apartment (T. 92) 
Appellant then testified: 
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(T. 92). 
Q: Then what happened? 
A: Well, my neighbor came back and, you know, 
it looks like he was a little bit excited 
or something like that. And he just told 
me to--
Mr. Reese (prosecutor): I object, your Honor. 
Hearsay. 
The Court: Sustained 
First, appellant contends that the statement given 
to him by Mr. Romero comes within the exception provided for 
by Rule 63(4) (b). The testimony by Mr. Haro clearly indicate' 
that Mr. Romero was in a of nervous excitement. The 
statements of Mr. Romero which the defendant tried to convey 
were also given irrunediately after Mr. Romero's encounter with 
Carlos Ibarra. The fact that the appellant felt it necessary 
to carry a weapon to defend himself after hearing what Mr. 
Romero told him (T. 98) corroborates the tense nature of 
the encounter between Mr. Romero and Carlos Ibarra. Further, 
the appellant's observation that Mr. Romero was excited is 
spontaneous and uncovered and re-enforces the veracity of 
the excited state of Mr. Romero. Given these considerations 
appellant contends he should have been allowed to testify 
as to the exact nature of Mr. Romero's remarks. 
Second, the trial court failed to consider the 
offered testimony under the concept of an excited utterance. 
Therefore, deference to the discretion of the trial court 
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on this matter cannot be exercised since the trial court 
did not consider the matter. 
The record is devoid of any indication that the trial 
court considered the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
offered testimony and then made a decision as to the reli-
ability of the statement under the strictures of the standard 
given in State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162. Appellant contends 
that as a matter of statutory and case law, he was entitled 
to such a determination. 
As a result of not considering the hearsay under the 
excited utterance exception, appellant contends his case 
was substantially prejudiced. Appellant was left without 
a basis on the record to support his testimony that he was 
afraid of being robbed or assaulted by Carlos Ibarra. The 
hearsay testimony goes to the heart of appellant's testimony 
that he reasonably acted in self defense. The record shows 
substantial evidence to allow the hearsay into the record 
under the excited utterance exception, but the court failed 
to make any such determination. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE CONVICTION 
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient 
lo support the verdicts and that the case should be dismissed. 
The authority of a reviewing court to reverse a verdict on 
insufficiency of the evidence is well settled. The standard 
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of review was stated in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 
1983) where it was stated: 
[W]e reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improb-
able that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted. 
Id. at 444. 
See also State v. Linden, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983). 
Specifically, the appellant contends the evidence was not 
sufficient to support a verdict of guilty under the terms 
of §76-5-103 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
Aggravated assault--(1) A person commits 
aggravated assault if he commits assault as 
defined in section 76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or 
force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
First, the evidence clearly indicates that the appell 
Mr. Haro, did not intentionally shoot Carlos Ibarra. While 
walking outside, the appellant testified that Carlos Ibarra 
and his brother, Miguel Ibarra, came up behind him (T. 100). 
Miguel Ibarra, according to the appellant, was carrying a 
pipe about two feet long (T. 108). Appellant, reacted to 
the confrontation, the pipe, and the threat he perceived, 
by shooting once at the ground (T. 100). Appellant's 
specific testimony during direct and cross examination shows 
that he did not intend to wound Carlos Ibarra (T. 100, 111). 
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Testimony of Carlos and Miguel Ibarra fails to indicate that 
they perceived the appellant's action as deliberate. The 
lack of any indication of deliberate and intentional action 
on the part of the appellant in the testimony of Carlos and 
Miguel Ibarra corroborates the appellant's testimony that 
he was just trying to stop them from approaching him (T. 111). 
Second, no evidence was introduced to indicate that 
the use of force by the appellant was likely to produce death 
or serious bodily injury. The treating physician and para-
medics did not testify nor did any medical expert establish 
the extent and nature of the wound. The police officer who 
testified at the trial stated he did not treat the wound 
(T. 73). The state failed to establish any medical evidence 
that the act in question was life threatening. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the verdict demonstrates that the evidence does not support 
the verdict. The state did not produce any evidence of 
intent to assault. The testimony of Carlos and Miguel Ibarra 
shows that the appellant did not confront them. Exactly how 
the confrontation occurred is not clear from their testimony. 
Appellant's testimony shows that he was surprised by the 
confrontation and given that he was concerned for his safety, 
his reaction was instinctive. The wound in the leg corro-
borates the appellant's intent to shoot at the ground. 
The totality of the evidence "must cover the gap 
belween the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt." 
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Petree at 444-45. The total lack of any medical testimony 
introduced by the state and the aspects of the testimony of 
Carlos and Miguel Ibarra which corroborate the appellant's 
testimony show that the gap between innocence and guilt 
was not covered. 
CONCLliSION 
The trial court erred in not considering the offered 
testimony of the appellant under the excited utterance excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. As a result, the case of the 
appellant was substantially prejudiced since he could not 
testify as to why he was afraid for his life. The evidence 
clearly was so questionable that it cannot support a conclu-
sion of intent to cause serious bodily injury and force likel\ 
to produce death or serious bodily injury. Under the standarc 
adopted by this Court, the convictions should be reversed 
because reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that appellant committed the crimes for which he stands 
convicted. 
Respectfully submitted this ;/('.'. day of 
October, 1984. 
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WILLI,'\.M ALBRIGHT 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this day of 1984. 
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